Dodd-Frank and the Future of Banking by Burns, Gregory
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Theses Theses
5-2013
Dodd-Frank and the Future of Banking
Gregory Burns
Clemson University, greg.burns24@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized
administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burns, Gregory, "Dodd-Frank and the Future of Banking" (2013). All Theses. 1581.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/1581
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
DODD-FRANK AND THE FUTURE OF BANKING 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to 
the Graduate School of 
Clemson University 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
Economics  
 
 
by 
Gregory Burns 
May 2013 
 
 
Accepted by: 
Dr. Raymond Sauer, Committee Chair 
Dr. Robert Tamura 
Dr. Andrew Hanssen 
  
 ii 
Abstract 
 
 
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 set the globally economy into a free-fall, 
requiring massive government intervention in order to prevent the entire system from 
crashing down.  The Dodd-Frank Act, the largest financial reform since the Great 
Depression, attempts to move the financial system towards a more stable foundation.  
Part 1 discusses the causes of the financial crisis and an overview of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
In part 2 explores the reform in the over-the-counter derivatives market with a focus on 
the impact to market participants, the impact on the systemic risk of the financial system, 
as well as the overall U.S. economy.  Part 3 analyzes the remittance transfer rule, which 
also carries the theme of transparency within the cross-border payments space. However, 
the requirements of the rule will likely result in increased costs and/or decreased choice 
for U.S. consumers sending money abroad.  In general, the Act does move the financial 
system towards a more stable foundation in some areas.  It does not however fully 
address the drivers of the financial crisis, end “Too Big To Fail”, or prevent another crisis 
from happening again.  Along the way it creates some unintended consequences that may 
hamper the economic recovery. 
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Chapter 1: The Financial Crisis and the Dodd-Frank Act 
The global financial crisis that spanned the years 2008-2009 has left a very visible 
impact on the world economy.  The world has a different view towards the world of 
finance.  Main Street views Wall Street as greedy, excessive risk takers gambling with 
taxpayer money.  Wall Street veterans, on the other end of the spectrum, long for the 
“good old days” without the newly created regulatory burdens collectively known as the 
Dodd-Frank Act (the Act) hampering, and sometimes crushing their business models.  
The focus of this paper is the Dodd-Frank Act, the largest financial reform since the 
Great Depression, and its intended and unintended consequences.  However, before one 
can discuss the Act one must first cover the events that led to  its creation.   
Numerous scholarly papers, magazine articles, and books discuss the events that 
led up to the financial crisis and the weekend in September 2008 that became known as 
“The weekend Wall Street died” by people with a far greater knowledge than I possess.  I 
will not attempt to offer an in depth analysis on the circumstances that transpired to 
create a perfect storm in the fall of 2008.  Andrew Ross Sorkin’s novel, Too Big To Fail, 
chronicles the months leading up to that September weekend and the after-shocks of the 
Lehman bankruptcy.  Michael Lewis’, The Big Short, offers insight into the murky world 
of credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations that were at the center of the 
crisis.  Besides these two popular novels, there are countless papers, articles, and other 
books that attempt to explain what happened to bring the financial system to the brink of 
collapse.  I will, however, provide a brief synopsis of events that led the financial system 
into the perfect storm that only needed one little push to send the dominos tumbling. 
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In the wake of the financial crisis, the term Glass-Steagall has once again become 
a common phrase uttered by the general public.  Glass-Steagall refers to the piece of 
legislation enacted in 1933 that separated commercial and investment banking.  The goal 
was to protect customer deposits (the commercial banking side) from the riskier side of 
the world of finance (investment banking).  This wall between commercial and 
investment banking lasted sixty-nine years until in 1999 the Graham-Leach-Bliley (GLB) 
Act tore down the remaining provisions of Glass-Steagall.  The worlds of investment and 
commercial banking could now be housed under one bank-holding corporation and the 
largest financial institutions jumped at the chance to create these financial supermarkets 
that became economies of scale. 
Another development we see in the final two decades of the twentieth century was 
the end of the private-partnership stand-alone investment bank.   When investment banks 
were private partnerships, the senior partners had a lot of personal money at stake and 
this provided the right incentives to engage in sound risk management practices.  
However, after these partnerships went public, the senior “partners” had weaker 
incentives for sound risk management practices.  There is always a risk vs. return trade-
off and given that it no longer was the senior “partners” money that was at risk, but rather 
the shareholders’, the incentives for sound risk management practices began to disappear. 
The changing landscape on the ownership of the country’s largest investment 
banks also coincided with the rapid financial innovation that began to move financing off 
balance sheet and into the “shadow banking system”.  This area of finance is called 
shadow banking because it is done off balance sheet through various special purpose 
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vehicles that roll up under the traditional banking legal entity.  This is where the phrases 
so commonly tossed around during the financial crisis, “credit-default swaps, mortgage–
backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, asset-backed commercial paper, etc, 
reside in the world of finance. 
The paper titled “Regulating the Shadow Banking System”, by Gary Gorton and 
Andrew Metrick focuses on this area of financial markets.  Indeed there are many reasons 
for activities to move into the shadow banking world, not the least of which is the extra 
profits that can be made for these activities which are considered complex and opaque by 
the general public.  Gorton’s paper focuses on the role of shadow banking in the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 and the fact that for the most part the Act does not attempt to bring 
the shadow banking system under a greater regulatory microscope.   
 The analysis is focused on three activities within the shadow banking world that 
provided advantages to traditional financing leading up to the financial crisis: (i) money-
market mutual funds (MMMFs), (ii) securitization to move financing off the traditional 
banks balance sheets, and (iii) repurchase agreements (repo) which used the asset-backed 
securities created by securitization and turned them into money like instruments. 
Shadow Banking in the Financial Crisis 
Gorton  (2010) among others argues that the financial crisis was a run on various 
forms of what investors had believed safe, short-term debt.   Much like in the past, when 
there were runs on time deposits, this financial crisis was a run on their “money like 
equivalents” in the uninsured space of the shadow banking system.   The “run on repo” 
was at the center of the crisis and the increase in repo haircuts caused the crisis to spread 
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from the subprime mortgage market to other asset classes.  As the repo market expanded 
in the two decades leading up to the crisis, this coincided with an increase in the amount 
of Treasuries held by foreigners and thus not eligible for collateral, we see a shortage of 
good collateral available.i  With demand exceeding supply there are a few options to 
bring the market back to equilibrium.  One of those options was to substitute other high-
quality “AAA” rated securities to fill the supply shortage.  However, as the financial 
crisis would later reveal, these “AAA” securities were imperfect substitutes to U.S. 
Treasuries and it became hard to distinguish good “AAA” from bad “AAA”.  When it 
becomes impossible to segregate the good from the bad, the market response is as one 
would expect, a flight from all “AAA” securities; a run on repo had begun.   
The crisis spread further when the Asset Backed Commercial Paper conduits 
(ABCPs) and Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) would purchase long run asset 
backed securities (ABS) and finance them with short-term debt.  This practice was 
successful when there was a market for short-term, overnight funding.ii  However, as 
discussed above, when this market dried up and overnight funding was no longer possible 
these ACBPs and SIVs struggled to meet their obligations.  The interconnectedness of all 
the major financial firms and the fact that all of this happened off-balance sheet, sent the 
financial system teetering on the edge of a cliff.  No one knew where their counterparties’ 
other exposures lied and feared a if a firm failed, despite having no or minimal exposure 
to the failed firm, they could be brought down due to a counterparty having a large 
exposure to the failed firm.  MMMFs were also hit during the crisis and as they struggled 
to maintain their goal of a net asset value of $1 per share there became a “flight to 
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quality” and the crisis in the MMMF space did not subside until the federal government 
stepped in an explicitly backed certain MMMFs.iii  Just like prior to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation where there had been bank runs on time deposits, the financial 
crisis can be viewed in a similar lens of a series of runs on near equivalents of time-
deposits that were in the unregulated, shadow banking system. 
An Overview of The Dodd-Frank Act: 
 On July 21, 2010 President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, known as “Dodd-Frank” bringing into effect the most 
comprehensive overhaul of financial regulation since the Great Depression.  Coming in at 
a final form of 849 pages it trumps past pieces of financial legislation.  To provide some 
comparisons to the sheer size of Dodd-Frank, The Sarbanes Oxley Act, which resulted in 
the wake of the Enron scandal, is only 66 pages.  Glass-Steagall, which separated 
commercial and investment banking during the Great Depression and to which a call to 
return has gained steam following the Great Recession, comes in at a mere 34 pages.iv  
The proposed Volcker Rule, “a 21st century Glass-Steagall”, is over 400 pages and its 
request for comment works out to approximately 1200 questions. 
 However, before we jump to analyze the consequences of specific sections and 
rules of Dodd-Frank, lets take a step back and look at the legislation as a whole.  The Act 
is made up of 16 Titles, which are further subdivided into sections.  While a majority of 
the Act focuses on the overhaul of institutional aspects of financial regulation two of the 
titles focus on consumer protection (X and XIV) and within title X of the act we see the 
creation of a new regulatory body, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).  
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This new bureau is intended to bring consumer protection under the eye of one regulator 
but as will be discussed further the unique power granted to this regulatory body has 
already created much conflict already in Washington.  Dodd-Frank also creates a new 
council to oversee all of the financial regulatory bodies.  The Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) is chaired by the secretary of the Treasury and also contains 
the head of the Federal Reserve, OCC, SEC, CFTC, FDIC, FHFA, NUCA, and CFPB.v   
The goals of the FSOC are to : identify risks to U.S. financial stability, eliminate the 
expectations of government bailouts, and respond to emerging threats to financial 
stability.vi  The FSOC is supposed to cover any gaps in the regulatory landscape that arise 
from different regulators charged with certain aspects of the world of finance.  Figure 1 
shows the complex nature of Dodd-Frank and the authority of the different regulatory 
agencies.  
 The goals of Dodd-Frank can be summarized into two major categories that are 
separated but also related.   David Skeel’s, The New Financial Deal, does an excellent 
job at analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act and keeping the big picture view that can be 
difficult given the size and complexity of the Act. The first aim that Dodd-Frank intends 
to achieve is to limit the systemic risk of the financial system.vii During the crisis of 
2008-2009 the systemic risk was so great that a crisis in one small particular area of the 
financial world (sub-prime mortgages) spread like wildfire infecting the rest of the 
system and bringing the world financial system as we know it to the edge of the abyss.  
 Dodd-Frank does many things in an attempt to limit the systemic risk of the 
financial system including removing the ability to rely on credit ratings, requiring hedge 
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funds to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, changes to the 
securitization landscape (via risk retention, ABS disclosures, and representation and 
warranties filings.) , and designating certain financial institutions as systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) which will face additional capital surcharges.  
However, there is also a benefit that comes along with the SIFI designation.  While 
Dodd-Frank explicitly says that there will be no federal bailouts of financial institutions, 
it is very hard to imagine that the government will not step in to prevent a SIFI from 
failing given their sheer size and reach in the financial world.  Since it is likely that the 
government will be forced to bailout a SIFI, these institutions will be able to borrow 
money at a cheaper cost than smaller financial institutions.viii    While all of these changes 
are intended to limit the systemic risk of the financial system, there are two other huge 
overhauls that this paper will focus on in greater detail: the regulation of OTC derivatives 
and changes to the remittance transfer landscape.   The former being directly related to 
the financial crisis while the other played no role in the events of 2008-2009. The 
regulation of OTC derivatives falls under Title VII of Dodd-Frank and is intended to 
bring increased transparency to the derivatives market while the intent the remittance 
transfer rule is to bring transparency to the consumer around cross-border payments. 
 The other major goal of Dodd-Frank is the ability to orderly resolve a failed 
financial institution without causing further damage to the rest of the financial system.  
This stems directly from the chaos that ensued following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.  
Dodd-Frank gives the FDIC the authority to place the failed firm into receivership and 
unwind the firm in an orderly fashion.ix  One way that Dodd-Frank attempts this is via the 
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piece of the Act that requires the largest financial firms to submit “living wills”.x  This 
living will is suppose to be a roadmap for the regulators to orderly unwind the firm.   
The argument goes that the FDIC can handle ordinary bank failures now so they 
should be able to handle the failures of the largest, systemically important institution 
failures with a similar model.xi  Anyone with any statistical background knows that you 
simply can’t take a model that is significant for one set of data and extrapolate it to data 
outside the range.  This logic is roughly the same.  The FDIC may be successful at 
handling smaller bank failures but there are vast differences between a small, community 
bank and a systemically important financial institution such as Citigroup or J.P. Morgan 
Chase.xii  The sheer size and increased complexity associated with the SIFIs compared to 
a small, community bank would be like a bike manufacturer entering into the aeronautical 
business.  Both can take you where you want to go, they just use very different means to 
do it.   Skeel argues that the resolution authority laid out in Dodd-Frank is far from the 
“orderly” adjective placed in front of it in section 210 of the Act.  In fact the way the Act 
structures the resolution authority will lead to a series of ad-hoc interventions that don’t 
provide managers of a firm the right incentives to prepare for an orderly resolution.  The 
“living will” is a good idea on paper, but in practice it may be much more troublesome to 
execute. 
Now that we have discussed the general overview of the Dodd-Frank Act we will 
take a deep dive into some specific rulemakings that have arisen from the Act and 
analyze their intended and unintended consequences to the financial system and the 
general public.   Parts of Dodd-Frank are good, some are bad, an some are just plain ugly.  
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The reform of the Over-the-Counter derivatives market is a radical change but is 
generally viewed as the “good”. While that section reform is aimed at limiting the 
systemic risk of financial institutions another rule analyzed in this paper is the first rule 
issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  The intent of the Remittance 
Transfer rule is good-natured in theory; to provide greater transparency to consumers 
sending money overseas.  However, as the rule is written and the challenges it poses, 
consumers could end up being harmed through increased costs for international money 
transfers.  Furthermore, this rule played no part in the financial crisis.  The following 
sections will provide a greater analysis of these topics. 
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Chapter 2: Reforming the OTC Derivatives Market 
 
 The mere mention of the word “derivatives” in the context of finance gets a horrid 
reaction from most of the general public.  During the financial crisis, financial derivatives 
jumped into the mainstream vocabulary,  an example for what is wrong with the financial 
system that led the country to the edge of an economic collapse. While almost everyone 
agrees that derivatives did play a role in the financial crisis, there is less agreement on 
how to fix the derivative markets in order to prevent a repeat of the events leading up to 
the fall of 2008.   Naturally derivatives are a key component of the Dodd-Frank Act; they 
get an entire title all to themselves.xiii  Before we jump in and analyze the impact of 
Dodd-Frank on the derivatives markets lets take a step back and talk about some of the 
characteristics of these markets. 
 The majority of trading derivatives occurs in what is known as the Over-the 
Counter (OTC) marketplace.  The OTC market dominates the exchange-traded market for 
derivatives in terms of notional value.  According to the Bank of International 
Settlements, at the end of 2011 the global outstanding notional value of OTC derivative 
contracts was around $648 trillion.xiv   Notional amount means the amount of the asset 
underlying the derivative (e.g. a interest rate swap on a $100 million dollar loan) 
compared to what a party would be required to swap with its counterpart. The notional 
value of the market is sometimes misconstrued as the risk the derivative market places on 
the world economy.  It is very convenient for opponents of OTC derivatives to use this 
number in describing the risk posed by these markets.  However, the true risk to the 
derivatives market is much smaller than the notional value.  The true risk posed by a 
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derivative contract is the amount that changes hands between the counterparties.  A $1 
billion interest rate swap does not equate to a $1 billion at risk if interest rates move.  The 
true risk is a small fraction of the notional value.  In this example if the contract requires 
one counter party to pay a fixed percentage of notional value while the other pays a 
floating amount based on market rates the at-risk amount is the difference between the 
fixed percentage and the market rate.  For simplicity’s sake let’s set both at 4% at the 
time the contract is entered into.  If the market rate shifts by 50 % dropping down to 2% 
or rising to 6%, which is an unusually large change, the at-risk amount becomes $20 
million or just two percent of the $1 billion notional amount.  
The term, over-the counter describes the fact that these contracts are privatively 
negotiated between the two counterparties.  There is little to no regulatory oversight as 
these contracts happen away from the regulators playground of exchanges.  There are 
many reasons for entering into an OTC derivative compared to an exchange traded 
derivative but essentially the custom nature of the OTC contacts (it is specifically drawn 
up and agreed by both counterparties) is one of the main reasons firms enter into OTC 
derivatives.  The problem with OTC derivatives is that you are relying on your 
counterparty to make good on their commitments.  This becomes troubling when you do 
not know the exposure your counterparty has to other parts of the market. As discussed in 
the introduction, the world of shadow banking makes uncovering counterparty exposure a 
very difficult task.  In the financial crisis, firms feared the worst of the exposure their 
counterparties had to the broader OTC market and assumed the worst and retreated from 
the market by closing out open trades.xv  When this became systemic we saw a rapid 
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liquidity drain that exacerbated the financial crisis that resulted in the extinction of a 
major stand alone investment bank in the United States  
 Dodd-Frank attempts to change the OTC market and bring it away from the 
shadow-banking world and into a more exchange-like market.  The CFTC and SEC are 
the main two regulators of the OTC market.  The CFTC handles swaps while the SEC is 
in charge of security-based swaps.  For simplicity’s sake this paper will focus on the 
CFTC regulated swaps but a natural link to security based swaps can be made.  The 
major difference between the two definitions is the underlying assets of the derivative.  
At a very high level view the reforms laid out for the OTC derivative market can be 
thought of in two groups: increased oversight for swap dealers and major swap 
participants and increased transparency.   While many of the derivative rules are still 
being finalized, the core elements of Dodd-Frank, Title VII, will allow us to analyze the 
impact to the OTC markets.   Prior to focusing on Dodd-Frank’s reform of the derivatives 
market we will cover some basic functions a derivative contract plays. 
 
A Primer on Derivatives 
Financial derivative is a very general term for a set of financial products that have the 
same underlying theme; that their value is derived based on an underlying asset.  That 
underlying asset can be essentially anything.  Derivatives have been constructed based on 
interest rates, commodity prices, foreign exchange rates, credit receivables, etc.  
Derivatives allow users to hedge against unexpected price movement in the markets.xvi  
For example, a farmer wants to hedge against price fluctuation of his corn crop and thus 
 13 
sells a futures contract locking in a set price for that season’s harvest.  This allows the 
farmer to better manage his risk in that his livelihood is no longer subject to the whims of 
the weather.    
The social gain of derivatives is that it shifts risk away from those who are willing 
to pay to avoid it towards those who can be paid to accept it.  They allow for a more 
efficient allocation of risk.  That said, it is easy for a detractor of derivatives to say that 
the banks should not be the ones accepting this risk.  However, banks are in a better 
position than an individual to manage risks like this.  We return to our farmer example to 
explain this concept.  The farmer enters into a futures contract with the bank that shifts 
the risk of a weather event negatively impacting his crops and thus reducing the amount 
he receives for them to the bank.  The bank can then turn around and offset the risk 
gained by entering into the futures contract with the farmer by an offsetting position with 
another customer.  The bank acts as the market maker bringing buyers and sellers 
together.  This is a much more efficient process than the time it would take the farmer to 
find the counterparty willing to take the other side of the futures contract.   Thus we have 
a social gain from derivatives when banks facilitate the more efficient shifting of risk 
among counterparties.  Another key benefit that derivatives play is in lowering the 
financing costs for firms who use derivatives as risk mitigating devices.  A firm that uses 
derivative contracts to hedge against credit risk, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, etc., 
is more likely to receive better financing terms from a bank extending credit than a firm 
that is not hedged.  A well-hedged firm is much more likely to repay its loans compared 
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to a firm that is exposed to shocks in the market that could potentially bring the firm 
under, thus resulting in a loss for the bank who extended the credit.xvii 
 Of course there are two sides to every coin and certain entities can use derivatives 
to speculate.  How one speculates in derivatives is by acquiring a large position in 
derivative contracts without a hedge on the underlying asset value.  For example 
amassing a large position in credit default swaps that are profitable as long as housing 
keeps going up without having hedges in place in the event that housing prices move the 
other way.  However speculation is a natural by-product of risk mitigation and the market 
over time typically makes the speculators bear a cost for their position   Barrings Bank, 
Long-Term Capital Management, Lehman Bros, and many other firms would be able to 
verify this if they were still around to tell their story.xviii   As free market enthusiast and 
ex-CEO of BB&T John Allison describes, firms who speculate and poorly manage their 
risk should fail. xix  It is an economic cost of their business strategy.  One point to note, 
before all three firms mentioned above crashed, rather magnificently and publicly, they 
all had runs of above average profitability.  
In its simplest form derivatives shift risk from those who lack the appetite to those 
who are willing to accept it.  Derivatives typically benefit both parties in the contract 
otherwise the contract wouldn’t be accepted.  It is illogical to think that a firm would 
willingly enter into a contract that will harm its financial condition.  Banks play a key 
role in this market by bringing buyers and sellers together with the bank acting as a 
counterparty to each side of the trades.  We now turn our attention to the increased 
oversight of the major players in the swaps market. 
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Regulation of Swap Entities 
 Many of the legal entities in which OTC derivative trading occurs are not subject 
to the same regulatory oversight as some of their sister entities under the same parent 
company umbrella.  Dodd-Frank attempts to change that by requiring Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants to register with the CFTC subjecting them to oversight that did 
not exist prior to Dodd-Frank.  
These requirements include business conduct standards, recordkeeping, and 
reporting requirements.   One of the big requirements of registration is a set of capital 
requirements, which for many entities that will become swap dealers it will be something 
that they were not previously subject to or the new requirement is at a higher level of 
capital than previously held.  As defined by the CFTC a “Swap Dealer” is anyone who: 
holds itself out as a dealer in swaps, makes a market in swaps, enters into swaps as part of 
its regular course of business, or is known by the Street as a dealer in swaps.xx  The spirit 
of this requirement makes logical sense, these swap entities were undercapitalized in the 
financial crisis exacerbating the crisis.  Therefore, increasing capital requirements for 
these entities would allow them to better withstand any “storm” that could lead to a 
government bailout.  One of the broad themes of Dodd-Frank is to reduce systemic risk.  
By subjecting the key swap entities to capital requirements the risk of a bailout due to 
undercapitalization is shrunk.  On paper this fits right in with one of the central themes of 
Dodd-Frank. 
   The cause for concern here being echoed by the industry is that this will increase 
the cost of entering into a derivative contract.  If banks have to hold additional capital 
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requirements for their swap entities one can be assured that some of this additional cost 
will be passed along to the counterparties who are entering into the swap contract.  This 
will in turn reduce the benefit for a firm to enter into a swap as part of a risk mitigating 
hedging strategy.   
 A very contentious requirement imposed on swap entities is known throughout 
the industry as the “push-out” provision; it is also known as the “Lincoln Amendment” 
for the senator from Arkansas who introduced this into the Dodd-Frank Act.   Section 716 
of the Dodd-Frank Act requires all swaps not covered by the National Banking Act of 
1864 to be pushed out of entities receiving assistance from the Federal Government.xxi  
This rule only applies to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants; end –users are 
exempt from the push out provisions.  However, almost every derivative contract 
involves at least one entity that will either become a Swap Dealer or Major Swap 
Participant.  At first glance the intent of this portion of the regulation makes sense; it 
separates certain swap activities perceived by the public as “risky” from the assistance of 
the federal government. The hindsight reaction of the financial crisis is that there was 
little downside risk or incentives to not engage in swap dealings since the firms believed 
the federal government will step in and bail them out if they get in trouble.  This rule 
alters the incentives for swap dealers to take on the same level of risk as, for the most 
part, they will be removed from the backstop of federal assistance.  The problem with this 
analysis is it is very difficult to analyze a Dodd-Frank rule in a silo. In the broader 
context of the derivatives market and looking at actual data the swap “push out” rule 
loses the strength that it is limiting speculative swap trading.  This paper will analyze the 
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swaps push out rule in two lenses: first are the asset classes required to be “pushed out” 
truly reducing systemic risk by discouraging speculative swap trading and second turning 
an eye to the international impacts of this rule. 
 The three asset classes that are required to be “pushed out” of federally insured 
entities are commodities, equities, and non-investment grade credit default swaps.  First 
off, two of these asset classes had little role in the financial crisis.  Commodity or equity 
swaps were not impacted by the financial crisis; the price volatility discussed in detail 
later provides evidence of their lack of involvement in the financial crisis. Before we 
compare the riskiness of these asset classes let’s take a look at the broader market and 
examine their market share of the OTC markets.   One would think that given the CDS 
market and all the problems caused by CDS during the financial crisis this would be a 
significant portion of the swaps market.  The devil lies in the details; the interest rate 
OTC market dwarfs all other asset classes combined.  At the end of 2011 out of the $648 
trillion notional amounts outstanding, approximately $505 trillion falls in the interest rate 
asset class.  Commodities and equities combined add up to slightly less than $10 
trillion.xxii  Even at the height of the financial crisis the swaps that are to be subject to the 
push-out provision only accounted for 5% of the total notional amounts outstanding.xxiii 
 Now that we see the “push-out” market share is very small in the grand scheme of 
the OTC market let’s analyze the objective that this rule will end risky speculative trading 
by entities receiving federal assistance.  Since some asset classes are permitted by the 
National Banking Act of 1864 and thus are not required to be pushed out by section 716 
there can  be an analysis using price volatility to test the assumption that these asset 
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classes are riskier comparatively to the interest rate and foreign exchange asset classes.  If 
these asset classes are indeed riskier and should be pushed out to limit the risk of a public 
bailout due to a commercial bank engaging in risky swap trading, then these asset classes 
should exhibit riskier price volatility than those of interest rate and foreign exchange 
asset classes.  Using moving averages of trading revenue as the indicator of price 
volatility the data shows the opposite to be true.xxiv  Foreign exchange and interest rate 
swaps exhibited greater price volatility than credit, commodity, and equity asset classes.  
In fact, commodity and equity asset classes exhibited the least price volatility and 
experienced no shock due to the financial crisis.  Credit swaps did see a level of high 
volatility during the crisis but have since tempered off. xxv The lack of volatility in equity 
and commodity swaps augments the statement that these asset classes are unnecessarily 
characterized as risky.  While sub-investment grade credit derivative swaps did play a 
substantial role in the financial crisis, the swaps push-out rule tends to unfairly punish 
two innocent asset classes. 
 When the push-out provisions take effect in the summer of 2013 what are the 
options for the banks?  The options for banks to consider are (i) stop trading in the push-
out derivatives, (ii) push these asset classes out into another entity, which will subject that 
entity to the additional capital requirements or (iii) push out all derivatives into the new 
entity.  Since derivative trading is a profitable business one would not expect the big 
commercial banks to stop trading in these asset classes.  Let’s examine the consequences 
of option (ii): pushing out the equity, commodity and non-investment grade derivatives 
into a separately capitalized entity.  These separate swap entities are not as highly rated as 
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their federally insured counterparts and therefore the cost of the swap contract is now 
increased as the dealer’s cost of capital is greater than those when the contract could be 
traded with a federally insured institution.  For equity and commodity swaps this 
increased cost seems unjustified since they played no role in the financial crisis and the 
data indicates they are no more likely to spark a future crisis.xxvi  Also, many firms  are 
currently able to engage in loans and derivatives from the same entity thus reducing the 
overall credit risk of that firm to the bank and thus allowing for a cheaper cost of 
borrowing for the firm.  Once the push-out provisions become effective the firm will now 
have to enter into a loan and derivative contract with two different entities of the parent 
company thus the borrowing costs are increased both explicitly (new swap entity is not as 
highly rated and thus requires additional collateral) as well as implicitly (opportunity cost 
of time of setting up all the new legal agreements required to enter into a swap) for the 
firm.xxvii 
 Another unintended consequence of the push-out provision is that the cost of 
creating a separately capitalized entity may push those banks that are on the margin out 
of the business thus increasing the concentration of derivative holdings to a smaller set of 
firms thereby countering the goal of reducing systemic risk across the industry.  These 
smaller community banks provide risk mitigation for their clients through offering 
commodity swaps, which allow the firms to hedge the risk of price fluctuations for their 
product.  Ms. Richardson’s analysis shows that for banks falling into the mid-size 
regional banks, between $10-$50 billion in assets, the main type of derivative held was 
in-fact commodity derivatives and not the sub-investment grade credit default swaps that 
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were a contributing factor to the financial crisis.xxviii  These banks may not find the cost 
of setting up a swap entity worth the gains achieved from remaining a participant in these 
asset classes.  The result would be less choice for clients as the amount of swap dealers 
shrinks for these markets.  One point of note here is that the concentration of push-out 
derivatives held by the big banks is skewed due to the fact that the sub-investment credit 
derivatives are likened to commodity and equity derivatives.  According to the Bank of 
International Settlements at the end of 2011 the notional amount outstanding for non-
investment grade credit default swaps was $5.49 Trillion.  Comparatively, the total 
notional outstanding for equity swaps and commodity swaps was 1.738 and 1.745 
Trillion respectively.xxix  That said, the push-out provision will have implications that go 
far beyond the banks commonly referred to as “Too Big to Fail” and may actually 
increase the importance of these banks as the regional banks exit from the market due to 
the increased costs from having to “push-out” equity, commodity and sub-investment 
credit derivatives into separately capitalized entities.  Firms will be deterred from 
entering the market because of the significant barriers to entry. 
 Another major concern is the extraterritoriality applications of the Title VII 
Reforms of the OTC Derivatives market.  Indeed the market for derivatives has been 
expanded as the globalization boom has taken hold in the past few decades.  US dealers 
can enter swaps with foreign companies and US companies can enter swaps with foreign 
dealers.  This becomes a big issue as various foreign governments are attempting to 
reform each of their respective financial systems after the crisis.  One of the big concerns 
here is international coordination; one only needs to look within our own country to see 
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the problem of coordination at the governmental level.  The European Monetary Union’s 
struggles implementing austerity measures in return for a bailout of the PIIGS also 
augments the problem with coordination at the international governmental level.   
Coordination is key or we could have instances such as double swap clearing and double-
reporting as both sides of the trade are required to clear & report the swap locally.  xxx 
One of the major concerns is that the US, being the leader at the regulatory forefront, 
would adopt rules governing OTC derivatives that are not universally adopted.  The 
“push-out” provision is a case in point.  Even though other areas of the globe have begun 
drafting their proposals to overhaul the OTC derivative market there seems to be little 
sign of following the US down the path of requiring certain asset classes to be “pushed 
out.” xxxi 
 Well, if foreign regulatory bodies do not follow suit with the “push-out” rule what 
are the implications to US banks?  For one, foreign banks are now at a competitive 
advantage compared to US banks.  For simplicity’s sake let’s assume each bank, one US 
and one foreign, uses their insured depository institutions to house a majority of their 
swap dealing business.   Also these banks’ insured depository subsidiaries have the same 
credit ratings.   As discussed above, one the advantages of doing this is the cheaper cost 
of capital.  Now the US bank has to “push-out” certain or all swaps to a separate 
capitalized entity.  This entity now has an implied higher cost of capital because it is not 
as highly rated compared to its insured depository institution brethren.  It lacks the 
government backing that keeps the cost of borrowing low.  So now it becomes more 
expensive for this new swap entity to deal in swaps.  Naturally, one would assume, some 
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of this cost will be borne by the other side of the trade entering into the swap with the 
dealer, the consumer of the swap.  This cost could come to fruition in many different 
ways.  For one, the counterparty must now post higher amounts of collateral at the swap 
entity compared to the swap dealer.  Also, the benefits of cross netting are reduced as a 
counterparty keeps its interest rate and FX swaps at the insured entity and its equity and 
commodity swaps are now within the new swap entity.  Meanwhile, the foreign bank 
counterpart does not have to push out its swaps and the counterparty could keep all of the 
trades with the insured depository entity.  This is cheaper because a) the dealer has a 
higher credit rating, which means less collateral need be posted, and b) the benefits of 
cross-netting can be realized as the counterparty holds all swaps with that dealer under 
the same entity.    
The impact of the “push-out” rule has two unintended consequences.  The first is 
that it harms the banks on the margin that would exit the market as the cost of creating a 
separate swap entity to continue to act as a dealer would not be worth the gains.  This 
would further concentrate the market for these asset classes as only the larger banks who 
have extensive swap business, which already make up greater than 95 % of the market 
would pick up additional market share.  Also, as a group, US dealers would be at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to their foreign counterparts who will most likely not 
be subject to a similar push out provision.  This could result in a shift of business from 
the US to foreign locations where entities are not subject to these provisions.  Ignoring 
the direct affect this has on the American economy through the loss of business, this also 
undermines one of the goals of Dodd-Frank.  That is, to reduce systemic risk through an 
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overhaul of the OTC derivatives market by driving trades that would currently happen in 
the US outside of our shores and away from the eyes of the US regulatory authorities.  
Now that we have analyzed the impacts of the Title VII rules to the swap entities we can 
take a look at the regulations impacting the particular swap transactions to discuss their 
impact on the future of banking. 
 
The Regulation of Swap Transactions 
 As discussed before, one of the main issues in the financial crisis was the lack of 
insight firms had into counterparty exposure, more formally known as, counterparty 
credit risk.  In plain English, counterparty credit risk is the risk that the counterparty on 
the other side of the transaction will not be able to meet its obligations.  This is a 
common component across the banking world.  For example, there is counterparty credit 
risk when the bank issues a mortgage so a couple can buy a home.  The counterparty 
credit risk is the risk that the couple will not able to meet their obligations to pay back the 
mortgage and the bank stands to lose the money they lent to the couple.  If the couple 
fails to payback the mortgage the bank can step in and foreclose on the house,’ i.e., they 
take over ownership of the house.  This ability to foreclose if the couple does not meet 
their obligations serves as a form of collateral; the bank is not at a complete loss for the 
principal amount they lent out in the mortgage because they are able to acquire the house 
which has some monetary value attached to it and thus offsets a portion of the loss on the 
mortgage loan.   
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The concept is similar with derivatives. If a situation worsens and it looks more 
likely that the counterparty will not be able to meet its obligations the firm can require 
that party to post collateral, known as margin, to offset the new change in events leading 
to a higher likelihood of not that the party will not be able to fulfill their obligation.  The 
problem in the derivatives market that is not as prevalent in the housing market is what is 
constitutes acceptable collateral.  In a mortgage “trade” one party receives a physical 
asset, the house, while the other party is promised that their money will be repaid plus 
interest.  The physical asset becomes the piece of collateral the one party can collect in 
case the counterparty fails to meet its obligations.  However, in the derivatives market 
there is no physical asset easily posted as collateral.  A derivative trade involves the 
exchange of funds based on the change in underlying value of a financial asset, although 
as evidenced by Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) there can be a connection between 
physical assets and a derivative trade.  As mentioned earlier, Gorton and Metrick argue 
that the lack of high-quality collateral contributed to the financial crisis.xxxii  Typically, 
margin calls, request for additional collateral, are invoked when the counterparty’s 
situation worsens.  This makes logical sense.  However, in the world of OTC derivatives 
it is very difficult to determine when the counterparty’s situation worsens since the 
positions taken are all done bilaterally off-exchange which makes calculating exposure 
very difficult.  The fall of 2008 showed what happens when firms assumed the worse 
about their counterparty’s exposure. 
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Game Changer: Central Clearing of Swaps? 
One of the main goals of Dodd Frank is to increase the transparency of the 
derivatives markets in order to provide greater security to the financial system.xxxiii  One 
of the main ways Dodd-Frank attempts to increase the transparency of the financial 
system is the introduction of a new major player to the swaps game: the central 
clearinghouse.  Dodd Frank gives the regulators the power to determine which swaps will 
be required to be centrally cleared through a clearinghouse (CCP). xxxiv The concept of 
central clearing changes the game for how swap trades are settled.  Prior to Dodd Frank, 
clearing and settlement for OTC derivatives happened bilaterally between the 
counterparties whereas in the post-Dodd Frank world the counterparties will use a 
middleman, the clearinghouse, who backstops each of the parties in the swap trade.  The 
counterparty risk is shifted over from the parties in the swap transaction to the 
clearinghouse.  In return for accepting this risk the clearinghouse will require margin to 
be posted by both parties of the transaction to help the clearinghouse absorb shocks in the 
markets.  Margin comes in two forms’; initial margin, which is posted at the point of 
initiation, as well as variation margin, which are adjusted to reflect changes in the 
underlying assets of the swap. 
This shift in risk from the various financial firms to a central clearing party should 
help with the uncertainty of counterparty credit risk that exacerbated the financial crisis 
in 2008.  Well, that depends on what the market for the number of central clearing parties 
ends up as.  If there are one or two central clearing parties then we will not see the end of 
the “Too Big to Fail”, but rather a shift from the country’s largest banks to the central 
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clearing houses.  A very small number of clearinghouses takes risks currently spread out 
across many firms in the derivatives market and centralizes them into one or two places, 
the clearinghouses.  The failure of one of these clearinghouses could devastate financial 
markets.xxxv  The prospect of multiple clearinghouses poses another set of risks, albeit 
these may be the worse of the two.  The presence of multiple clearinghouses leads to 
competition for business and thus the risk that competitive forces lead to lax standards 
required for a clearinghouse to accept a swap for central clearing counteracting the effect 
of requirement.xxxvi   
Another view of the requirement of central clearing suggests a limited number of 
clearinghouses will be the likely outcome.  It is embedded in human nature that the 
ability to conduct all your needs in the fewest spots possible is desired, providing 
evidence that there are economies of scale in serving consumer choice.  The rise of Wal-
Mart, sporting good stores, major department stores, and many others support this 
statement.  People would rather go buy their meat, fruit, vegetables, bread, and snack 
food at one grocery store instead of going to a butcher shop, bakery, and farmers market 
to get the same products.  The opportunity cost of time is a vital component of the 
consumer utility function, which we will revisit in the second half of this paper when we 
focus on another aspect of Dodd Frank.   
Firms have similar behaviors to that of consumers in that they want to conduct 
their business in the most efficient way possible.  As mentioned in discussing the 
implications of the swap push-out provisions where firms would rather deal with one 
entity for all of their swaps to take full advantage of the benefits of cross-netting the same 
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logic can be applied to the swap entities.  A swap entity would rather post collateral at 
one clearinghouse for all its swaps, to take advantage of cross netting, instead of posting 
collateral at multiple clearinghouses.xxxvii 
A regulatory requirement that goes hand-in-hand with central clearing is that a 
swap required-to-be cleared must be traded over a newly created Swap Execution 
Facilities (SEFs).  Along with central clearing, requiring swaps to be traded over a SEF is 
a huge shift in moving towards an increase in transparency of the swaps market.  The 
bilateral nature of the current way the OTC market deals in swaps leads to very opaque 
pricing, which allows for sizable profits for the dealing entities that benefit from the 
asymmetric information advantage.  While other market participants could attempt to 
acquire the information to ensure a level playing field the cost to acquire the information 
tends not to be worth the incremental gain that the participant would realize from the 
extra information.  Requiring swaps to be traded over the SEFs attempts to put an end to 
the opaque nature of pricing in the swaps market. There will be significant impacts on the 
revenues the largest firms earn in this space.  As information becomes more publically 
available one would expect some price compression among the market makers who have 
benefited from the opaque nature of OTC derivatives as well as their asymmetrical 
information advantage.  According to a Deloitte study for the Swaps and Derivatives 
Market Association (SDMA), the predicted loss in revenue could be as great as 30-35% 
due to the increased transparency.xxxviii  In aggregate terms that is a reduction in $15Bn in 
revenues according to the New York Times.xxxix  
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Given the expected compression in profit margins in dealing with swaps that are 
required to be cleared one would think there is a strong incentive for the major swap 
players to do everything in their power to keep the majority of swaps away from the 
mandatory clearing requirements and their corresponding exchange trading requirements.   
There is, however, an additional twist for un-cleared swaps; these are subject to 
additional margin requirements.  The margin rules for un-cleared swaps have yet to be 
finalized but there are two corresponding proposed rules that lay out the basic framework 
the regulators are considering.  One rule is issued for swap entities that are regulated by a 
prudential regulator (e.g. OCC) and another by the CFTC for swap entities not regulated 
for a prudential regulator.  While there are some differences between the two proposals, 
there are common themes, including that margin be segregated at a third party custodian, 
and the big one, that the margin is greater compared to a cleared swap of similar 
characteristics.xl  So there is an increased cost in trading in un-cleared swaps that presents 
itself by the additional margin requirements. 
Now that we have discussed the requirements for both cleared, exchange traded 
swaps as well as those for un-cleared bilateral swaps, we roll things up to a higher level: 
what will the derivative market look like 5 years from now?  Ideally the goal of the 
regulators is to move as many swaps as possible to a centrally cleared, exchange-traded 
environment.  This increases transparency and thus limits systemic risk by reducing the 
uncertainty of counterparty credit risk, although it also potentially concentrates risk in the 
central clearinghouses.  The ability to reduce the risk lies in the ability of the regulatory 
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bodies to catch any signs of trouble earlier than if the risk is spread out among many 
financial institutions.xli   
The ability to move the majority of swaps into the centrally cleared category is 
another component that impacts the success of increasing transparency.  One can 
naturally expect the first swaps to migrate toward a central clearing model to be the 
“plain-vanilla” swaps, these are relative common standard swap transactions that make 
themselves the most eligible candidates for central clearing environments.  As evidenced 
by the Bloomberg study the main reason banks enter into swaps is to mitigate risk rather 
than speculate on price fluctuations.  Of course banks do profit from their market making 
activities as well so derivatives serve dual purposes.   One benefit of the current business 
model of off-exchange bilateral swaps is the customizable nature of the contracts.  As 
firms became bigger and more complex their risk profiles followed suit.  Firms can enter 
into very customized swap contracts that allow them to better mitigate their risks than a 
standard “plain-vanilla” swap.  That is one reason the OTC market developed the way it 
did.  It provided banks with the ability to tailor specific swap contracts to fit their unique 
risk portfolios.  If the “plain-vanilla” swap satisfied the bank’s risk mitigation strategy 
there would not have been a need to undergo the costs to develop the more customized 
swaps for risk mitigation.  However, as the interest rate and credit risk profiles of the 
banks became more complex due to evolutions in financial products the demand for 
customizable swaps soon followed.  Professor Darrell Duffie, who has done extensive 
work on the derivatives markets, predicts that about 80 % of swaps will be subject to 
mandatory clearing.xlii  We are now faced with the 80/20 predicament; that is will 80% of 
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the swaps entered into be the 20% that are still traded off-exchange thus minimizing the 
effect of increased transparency provided by central clearing and exchange trading?  Like 
everything else, that determination comes down to a favorite tool of economists, the cost-
benefit analysis.   For a bank to satisfy a particular demand, they must determine which 
path will yield the biggest spread in benefits compared to costs, or in other words, for the 
same level of benefit, which will be the least costly for the banks.  To determine this it all 
comes down to the compression in profit margins on the cleared swaps compared to the 
increased costs for an un-cleared swap.  While there are additional costs for trading in un-
cleared swaps, these could be potentially offset by the profit margin gained due to 
asymmetric information on the side of the swap dealer.  Essentially there is a trade-off.  
The cleared swaps are cheaper, but yield less return and also potentially don’t mitigate 
risks as well as the more customizable swap and the swaps that better mitigate risk are 
more expensive.  This contradicts the goal of Dodd Frank of reducing systemic risk.  
One possible solution would be for the regulators to issue rules in a manner where 
a bank has more of an incentive to trade in centrally cleared swaps. Presumably this 
would occur through margin requirements for un-cleared swaps that would erase any 
asymmetrical information advantage, the driver that boosts profit margins and could pose 
serious challenges in determining the right amount of additional margin requirements.  
While only time will tell what happens, banks will have a strong incentive to keep their 
most lucrative swap contracts away from the transparent exchange trading environments.  
This should not be overly difficult in the near to immediate term as the most 
customizable swaps, and arguably the most profitable, will be difficult to standardize to a 
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level needed to move onto a centrally cleared, exchange like environment.  Even when 
regulators find a way to move these swaps to the centrally cleared exchanges, there will 
be some “new” product created that is traded off-exchange and thus can reap the rewards 
of the profit margin.  There need to be proper incentives in place to see the majority of 
the swaps business move onto centrally cleared environments.  According to the author 
Satyajit Das’s extremely insightful, yet cynical portrait of the derivatives markets is there 
are two categories that everything in derivatives falls into.  It is a combination of 
“knowns” and “unknowns”.xliii   What is “known” about Dodd-Frank’s overhaul of the 
OTC derivative markets is that Dodd Frank will increase the transparency of derivatives 
and thereby ease some of the uncertainty that was present in 2008 and which exacerbated 
the financial crisis.  The “unknown” is just how much will we see the systemic risk 
reduced by increased transparency.  Central clearing does not eliminate counterparty 
credit risk or end “Too Big to Fail”.  Swap dealers still have incentives to keep swaps off-
exchange to utilize the increased profit margins caused by asymmetrical information.  
While the new regulations are an improvement from the pre-crisis regulation of 
derivatives, the outstanding question remains on the magnitude of the improvement.   
That magnitude is contingent on the regulatory bodies implementing rules that provide 
the right set of incentives for the players and also their ability to enforce the requirements 
necessary to realize the gains of central clearing and exchange trading.xliv  One thing that 
is a “known” is that banks will always attempt to create new financial products that will 
not be subject to the current regulatory rules that compress profit margins.  There is too 
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much money at stake to not expect institutions to come up with new creative ways to 
realize some of the gains to be had. 
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Chapter 3: Consumer Regulation and its Impacts on Choice 
  
While a majority of the Act focuses on reform of the institutional sector of 
financial products and use of those products that pushed the system to the edge of the 
precipice there is an entire section of Dodd-Frank allocated to the reform of consumer 
finance.  There is no debate that subprime mortgages played their part in the financial 
crisis with the blame spread across consumers, banks, and the government.   However 
many consumer reform items that are contained Section X of the Act have nothing to do 
with mortgages and contributed nothing to the root causes of the financial crisis. Section 
X, which resulted in the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), is 
an example of pork-barrel legislation at its finest.   One of the big differences between the 
CFPB and the other regulatory bodies is the lack of congressional oversight on the CFPB.  
They are unique from their regulator brethren in that they are not subject to the 
congressional appropriations process.  This feature, as well as the recess appointment of 
Richard Cordray as director, has led to a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the 
CFPB.xlv  While there are many elements relating to consumer protection the Act this 
paper will focus on only one of those sections and its impact to consumers.  Its official 
name is “The Final Remittance Rule (Amendment to Reg E).”  However, it is known by a 
whole assortment of names including “Remittance Transfers” and “Dodd- Frank 
1073”.xlvi  For purposes of this paper, we will refer to this regulation as “Dodd-Frank 
1073”. 
 Prior to jumping into the analysis of Dodd-Frank 1073 let’s revisit some of the 
basics elements of consumer theory, one of the building blocks of microeconomic theory.  
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Consumer theory rests on a couple of basic assumptions, first of which is that individuals 
are rational decision makers.  Despite the fact that an individual may make an irrational 
decision, it is thought on the whole that consumers make decisions rationally.  Another 
underlying assumption of consumer theory is scarcity.  That is, there are a limited number 
of resources available for consumption.  Expanding on the concept of scarcity we see the 
emergence of consumption bundles where each bundle is a set of goods available for 
consumption.   As Jehle and Reny (2001) point out a consumer’s goal is to seek the 
specific consumption bundle from the set of available bundles that is most preferred.xlvii  
The bundle that is “most preferred” is measured by the notion of utility.  Utility is a way 
to measure things that are hard to quantify, specifically how a consumer is “better off” 
from the consumption of a good.  We now come full circle back to the concept of the 
rational individual.  The rational consumer seeks to maximize his or her utility given a 
fixed budget.  In other words they consumer the best possible combination of goods as 
given their set of preferences and budget.  Mathematically, Jehle and Reny represent this 
as:  max𝑢 𝐱    𝑠. 𝑡.𝐩 ∗ 𝐱   ≤ 𝐲 .  Where u(x) represents the utility for consuming 
consumption bundle x subject to the constraint that the price (p) of consumption bundle x 
is less than or equal to the budget y.xlviii 
 Everything an individual does in the course of the day, week, or year makes up a 
component of their utility function for that time period.  One of these elements is the 
movement of money or payments.  There are countless reasons for making a payment and 
nearly as many mediums to deliver that payment.   The simplest of these mediums is also 
the oldest, physical delivery.  The payment space is not isolated from the advances in 
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technology.   Some of the largest banks in the US allow you to pay bills from your 
mobile phone, money can be transferred from one individual to another over the internet, 
and the clearest example is the rise of credit and debit cards for transactional based 
payments.  As Jonkey and Kosse [2008] point out, consumers favor the speed and safety 
of electronic credit transfers compared with their paper counterparts.xlix  From the 
comforts of a chair at the beach one can pay their car bill, mortgage, and electric bill all 
with a couple of taps on their smartphone.   
What factors caused the market to develop in the way that it did?  Part of  the 
market development can be attributed to the rise of the Internet.  The Internet has 
connected the world in such a way that now with a couple of clicks one can see the 
weather in Sydney, check the news in New York, and search for hotel rooms in London.  
Naturally, markets have developed allowing consumers to buy and sell goods over the 
Internet.  As a result of remote buying and selling there developed need for remote 
payment systems needed to handle such transactions.  There are Point of Sale transactions 
where debit or credit cards are the common mediums of payment, as well as transfers of 
funds for remote settlement.  The former mainly involves payments between an 
individual and a retailer or other entity.  The latter is usually on a more individual-to-
individual basis or for something of high value where the amount of the payment is 
typically not paid via credit card.   Another factor is the increase in global migration.  In 
simplest terms, the world’s population is moving farther away from their respective place 
of birth; more people in absolute terms are migrating to another country.l   The causes of 
this go beyond the scope of this paper but in general the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
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rise of free market centers in Asia and the Middle East, and the economic environment of 
some traditional economic centers have turned many workers into expatriates, in search 
of a better life.   This results in an increase in demand from consumers to send money 
back “home”.  From a cross-border payment perspective, an electronic credit transfer has 
many benefits over their paper-based counterparts, of which, speed of transaction time 
being the predominant one.   Also, the transaction costs borne by banks are cheaper for 
electronic credit transfers when compared to paper-based.  Thus there is an incentive for 
banks to push consumers toward these products.li   However, when compared to their 
domestic counterparts cross-border electronic transfers are perceived as more confusing 
and costly from a sender’s perspective.  The International Bank Account Number (IBAN) 
and Bank Identifier Code (BIC) required on most cross-border transactions exemplify 
this point.  A survey conducted as a part of Jonkey and Kosse’s research points out that 
58% of their population did not know what the purpose of the IBAN and BIC codes as 
well as a staggering 67% also stated that they would not know where to find them.lii   By 
removing this confusion in the minds of consumers, one would expect to see further 
increases in the number of consumers using cross-border electronic credit transfers to 
deliver funds.  This is precisely the payment space that is the focus of the Dodd-Frank 
1073 rule and for those payments subject to Dodd-Frank 1073, the new regulation is truly 
a game changer.   
 The focus of the Dodd-Frank 1073 regulation is centered on reforming cross-
border electronic funds transfers initiated by a consumer.  The intent of the statue is to 
provide increased consumer protections with respect to cross-border payments.  The 
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underlying cause of this regulation stemmed from individuals sending money to family 
members abroad and the amount expected was not always the amount that arrived.  
Senator Daniel Akaka from Hawaii, author of Dodd-Frank section 1073, had these 
comments on the final rule issued by the CFPB.   
 "Now, simple disclosures will empower consumers with important information, including 
the amount of currency that the recipient will receive, the promised date of delivery, and the rights 
of the sender regarding the resolution of errors.  This is the information that consumers need to 
know so they can properly compare the rates and fees deducted from their remittances. “liii 
 The new regulation requires a disclosure of all fees and taxes associated with the 
payment, the exchange rate used in the transaction, the date the funds will be available to 
the recipient, as well as provisions for cancellation and error claims.  Simply put, the 
consumer that is initiating the payment will receive a disclosure stating all of the charges 
associated with the cost of the transaction that will allow the consumer to “price shop” to 
the determine the remittance transfer provider that can provide the desired service for the 
best cost.  This all sounds great on paper.  The consumer has more information about the 
costs of the transaction and can make the decision that is the most cost effective.  Based 
on our consumer theory discussed above this should allow for an increase in consumer 
utility as their decision to select the most cost-effective provider maximizes the amount 
of income available for consumption of other goods.   
The regulation does not prevent institutions from charging the sender and/or 
receiver for these services.  A role of financial intermediaries is to bring market 
participants together creating transactional efficiency. They have asymmetrical 
information advantages based on their position and are thus are able to realize gains from 
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brining buyers and sellers together.  However, in the broader picture, they serve as a key 
function in society.  We would not have the globalized market that we do today if buyers 
and sellers had to spend all their time searching each other out.  Intermediaries serve that 
function allowing for buyers and sellers to spend time on other things leading to a greater 
benefit for all.   A presumed additional benefit to the consumer’s consumption is the 
notion that the increased transparency in charging practices should foster price 
competition that will drive down the cost to send a cross-boarder payment.  The question 
becomes, do the facts support these presumed benefits.  We now examine the two major 
types of payment systems to see if the expected result of improving consumer utility 
through price transparency and reduced costs will come to fruition. 
 
Closed-Looped vs. Open Networks: Trade Offs  
The first payment type we will examine is known as a “closed loop payment 
network”.  A key characteristic of the closed network system is that the entire flow of the 
payment stays within the network of the provider.  Western Union is a classic example of 
a “closed loop network” provider in that  funds are sent from one Western Union office to 
another.  The payment never leaves the Western Union network and thus the provider can 
exhibit greater control over the payment.  This greater control should lead to a burden of 
compliance that is relatively straightforward to implement.  Since the payment travels in 
a closed network the amount of charges applied, exchange rate used, and date the funds 
will be available should be readily available and thus would be just be required to be 
disclosed, if they aren’t currently disclosed. 
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Since closed networks seem to have desired result in the payment space, how 
come they aren’t used exclusively for sending cross-border payments?  It comes back to 
consumers’ utility maximization.   The positives of a closed loop network are also drivers 
of a big negative in terms of presence.  A closed looped network requires that there are  
branches of the closed loop at both ends of the transaction, which can lead to significant 
costs for a company.  However, given the presence of a Western Union agent in over 200 
countries and 500,000 locations that burden of a closed looped network does not seem to 
be as big of a burden for a consumer’s choice.liv  That said, the requirement to be on site 
for both sides of the transaction does pose a significant barrier to entry for aspiring 
competitors to Western Union, MoneyGram, and the likes.  The bigger downside to the 
closed looped network is the timing of delivery.  In a fully closed loop system there is a 
requirement for both the sender and the recipient to physically be present when sending 
and receiving funds respectively.  These money transfer organizations’ specialty is the 
cash-to-cash transaction space.  The opportunity cost of time negatively impacts the 
utility functions of the sender and the recipient.  
There is an option available when sending a payment via a money service 
provider to have funds deposited into a bank account at the receiving end.  However, this 
takes the payment out of the completely closed looped space. Let’s walk through an 
example to illustrate this.  John, located in the United States, wants to send $1,000 USD 
to his grandmother located in country B. However,  he doesn’t want  his grandmother to 
have to travel somewhere to get  the funds  but, would rather the payment just be 
deposited into her bank account.   Whether it is implicit or explicit, John is helping his 
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grandmother maximize her utility by not having to make a trip to pick up the funds.  So, 
John initiates the transaction  with a money service provider to transfer funds from the 
US office to his grandmother’s bank account at the National Bank of Country B.  Once 
John has made the payment for the transaction, the first leg of the payment travels in the 
closed network environment from the US to country B all within the money service 
provider’s system.  It is the next part where the break from the closed network happens.  
The money service provider may or may not have an account at the National Bank of 
Country B.  If they do, they would initiate a SWIFT messagelv (in this case an MT 103) 
instructing National Bank of Country B to pay John’s grandmother.  If instead, they have 
an account at the Commercial Bank of Country B they would send the SWIFT MT 103 to 
the Commercial Bank of Country B instructing payment to be made to John’s 
grandmother at National Bank of Country B.  Commercial Bank sends the payment 
through the local clearing system to National Bank who credits the funds to John’s 
grandmother account.  The latter half of this transaction, the portion that results in the 
funds being credited to John’s grandmother’s account, enters the open network 
environment.  Of course, this extra step to credit the funds to an account is not done for 
free, and depending on the arrangements of the particular situation, either can affect the 
amount of funds John’s grandmother receives and/or is borne by the money service 
provider, who in turn could pass the cost off to John.lvi 
The alternative to the closed loop system is the open loop network where many 
participants send payments to each other via various settlement and communications 
systems.  The parties involved  in an open loop network usually are deposit taking 
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financial institutions, but may also include broker-dealers and other non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFIs).  The most common form of an open network payment type is the 
wire transfer.  Wire transfers provide a quick and secure method to deliver high-value 
payments across the globe.  This is one reason why the market developed; there was a 
demand for the ability for consumers to deliver large amounts of money in a quick and 
secure manner.  Since wires are the most common cross border open network transaction, 
that will serve as our focus for analyzing the open network market.  We begin with the 
basics of a cross-border wire transaction. 
While certain financial institutions do offer variations, the standard among wire 
transactions are  account-to-account transactions.   In an account-to-account transaction 
both the sender and the receiver must have established accounts with the sending and 
beneficiary institutions.  Also, there is no delivery of physical funds as the payment goes 
from one account to another.  Since Dodd-Frank 1073 focuses solely on US originated 
payments,  we will focus the description of a cross-border payment flow to a US 
originated transfer in US dollars.  The sender of the payment holds an account at a US 
bank  and wishes to initiate a cross-border payment to an account at a bank in a foreign 
country, known as the beneficiary bank 1. The	   customer	   selects	   the	   amount	   of	   funds	   he	   wants	   to	   transfer	   and	   the	  process	   begins	   with	   internal	   movement	   through	   the	   US	   bank’s	   operations	  center	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2. Here	  is	  where	  we	  see	  if	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  domestic	  wire	  payments	  (sent	  directly	   through	   Fedwire	   to	   the	   receiving	   bank)	   and	   cross-­‐border	   wire	  payments	  which	  typically	  take	  one	  of	  two	  paths:	  a. The	   beneficiary	   bank	   has	   a	   direct	   relationship	   with	   the	   US	   bank	  initiating	  the	  transaction;	  the	  foreign	  beneficiary	  bank	  has	  an	  account	  on	  the	  books	  of	  the	  US	  bank.	   	   	  In	  this	  case,	  what	  is	  known	  as	  a	  “book	  transfer”	  is	  made	  by	  the	  originating	  bank	  from	  the	  sender’s	  account	  to	  the	   foreign	   beneficiary	   bank’s	   account	   	   by	   	   including	   	   an	  accompanying	   SWIFT	   MT	   103	   to	   the	   beneficiary	   bank	   with	  instructions	  	  for	  further	  credit	  to	  the	  recipient’s	  account.	  b. The	   beneficiary	   bank	   does	   not	   have	   a	   direct	   relationship	   with	   the	  originating	   US	   bank	   but	   rather	   has	   a	   relationship	   with	   another	  correspondent	  bank	  in	  the	  US.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  originating	  bank	  sends	  the	   payment	   through	   one	   of	   the	   US	   clearing	   systems	   (CHIPS	   or	  Fedwirelvii)	  to	  the	  US	  correspondent	  of	  the	  beneficiary	  bank	  and	  either	  advises	  the	  beneficiary	  bank	  directly,	  known	  as	  “advise	  and	  cover”	  in	  the	  industry,	  or	  through	  the	  US	  clearing	  payment	  message	  by	  sending	  the	   message	   serially.	   	   The	   US	   correspondent	   then	   preforms	   a	   book	  transfer	  crediting	  the	  funds	  to	  the	  beneficiary	  bank’s	  account.	  3. The	   beneficiary	   bank	   now	   has	   the	   funds	   in	   	   its	   account	   and	   processes	   the	  payment	   for	   further	   credit	   to	   the	   recipient’s	   account.	   	   If	   the	   recipient’s	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account	  is	  denominated	  in	  a	  currency	  other	  than	  USD,	  a	  foreign	  exchange	  will	  also	  be	  preformed	  prior	  to	  crediting	  	  the	  funds.	  
In some instances there may be additional intermediary banks involved in the transaction.  
The route of the wire or transfer is all driven  based on the relationships established 
between the  originating and beneficiary banks.  Now that we have described the steps in 
the payment flow, let’s look at how charges are typically applied.  As previously stated, 
the heart of Dodd-Frank 1073 is full transparency in the amount of charges that affects 
the net amount received by the sender.  The first charge we will  review can  simply be 
called the “outgoing wire fee.” This would be the fee that the  originating bank charges 
the sender to initiate a wire transfer.   The amount associated with this charge is 
dependent on the sender’s arrangement with the originating bank.  Naturally, some clients 
may receive this service for free.  This charge is typically debited from the account  in 
addition to the amount being sent.  So, if a sender  wants to wire $1,000 USD and it costs 
$30 to send USD internationally,  the sender’s account will be debited for $1,030 with 
$1,000 sent for processing.   The  originating bank  will then make a book transfer to the 
beneficiary bank and depending on the relationship arrangements made between the two 
banks, the beneficiary bank may elect to be charged separately to receive  the incoming 
wire or have the charge deducted out of the proceeds.  This deduction from the proceeds 
is known as a “lifting fee” in that the fee is lifted from the principal of the transfer instead 
of charged separately.  The number of intermediary banks involved in the payment chain 
could affect the number of lifting fees applied.  However,  market practice is for  there to 
be a two lifting fee maximum deducted from the payment. Although in many instances,  
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there may be only one or  no lifting fee applied.  The third type of fee that may be applied  
relates to the crediting of funds to the beneficiary by the beneficiary’s bank.   Similar to 
the fact that there is an outgoing wire fee to send a payment, typically there is a fee 
charged to receive an incoming payment to an account. This fee is known as an 
“incoming wire fee.”  How this fee is applied, either deducted from principal or charged 
separately, depends on the beneficiary bank’s fee structure and varies from bank to bank.   
The method of application of the incoming wire fee  does not affect the recipient’s utility 
because the recipient bears the cost either way, but is just a timing difference. 
Dodd-Frank 1073: The Industry Game Changer 
While briefly discussed before, we will now explore the Final Remittance Rule 
published by the CFPB  on   February 7, 2012, as well as the revised proposal  made to 
the rule on December  21, 2012, .  The main theme of the rule is the increased consumer 
protections as  they relate to cross-border electronic transfers initiated by an individual in 
the United States, whose account is domiciled in the US, to any recipient located in a 
foreign country.  For purpose of this rule transfers to and from the US to the five official 
US territories are not considered to be cross-border electronic transfers.  The protections 
the sender receives includes a transparent description of all charges to be applied, foreign 
exchange rate if there will be a currency exchange during the transaction, as well as any 
taxes deducted out of the payment that are a result of an institution providing the 
servicing of the payment.  So theoretically, in the end, the sender will see a full picture 
and know exactly the net amount the beneficiary will receive.   The disclosure must also 
include  the date that the funds will be available to the recipient.  Additional protections 
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include the ability to cancel the transaction up to 30 minutes after authorization of 
payment, as well as 180 days to file a claim  where there was an error with respect to any 
item on the receipt disclosure.  For example, if the receipt said that the funds would be 
available in three days time but something caused the funds to be delayed, that would 
result in an error and  cause a list of remedy options available to the sender. In light of the 
previous description of cross-border wire transfers, we will examine how this rule will 
impact the process and where some elements of the rule will be very difficult to 
implement. 
 There are five specific elements that may affect the payment amount that are 
required to be clearly displayed on the disclosure in order that the sender may understand 
the true cost of the transaction. While the disclosure contains numerous other  
information,  these five elements are at the heart of  the intent of the regulation , along 
with the date  the funds are available to the recipient ( which appears on the receipt once 
the customer has authorized payment of the transaction).  As mentioned before, this  
disclosure is a positive and should improve consumer utility because consumers are now 
more informed and can choose the remittance transfer provider that will suit their needs 
the best.  This  disclosure requirement is in line with the theorem that a rational consumer 
makes decisions based on their utility maximization.  These five disclosure elements are: 
(1) the fees charged by the remittance transfer provider (“Transfer Fees”), (2) the taxes 
collected by the remittance transfer provider (“Transfer Taxes”), (3) the exchange rate 
used in the transaction, (4) the fees charged by parties other than the remittance transfer 
provider (“Other Fees”), and (5) taxes collected by parties other than the remittance 
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transfer provider (“Other Taxes”).  The intent is that the sender now can see a transparent 
view of the elements that impact the net amount received by the recipient. The first two 
elements, “Transfer Fees” and “Transfer Taxes” are the easiest requirements for 
remittance transfer providers to  provide since they already have this information at their 
disposal;  they are the charges and taxes  the remittance provider collects.  The other 
three elements may pose some challenges and thus we will examine these three 
requirements in more detail. 
Let’s first examine the disclosure of the exchange rate  when there is an exchange 
of currency , as,  on paper, this seems  to be relatively straightforward.  Currently in the 
market, cross-border transfers initiated within the US are typically sent in US dollars 
(USD).  Data shows that in 2012 USD represented over 88% of the traffic going from the 
US to another country.lviii  This includes traffic initiated by all individuals and 
corporations, which may present some bias in the data, but directionally the data tells a 
very interesting piece in that most of the traffic flowing out of the US is going out in 
USD.  The reasons for this could be endless: familiarity, obligation must be paid in USD, 
beneficiary’s account is denominated in USD, foreign country uses USD as local 
currency, beneficiary is likely to get a better FX rate at  his/her bank, etc..  However, it is 
safe to say that there is a large portion of this traffic that prior to settlement into the 
beneficiary’s account is converted to a currency other than USD and then credited to the 
beneficiary’s account in that converted currency.  Now that we have described the current 
market practice,  let’s examine the impact of the requirements in the Dodd-Frank 1073 
regulation.  
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The regulation requires the exchange rate that is used  must be quoted in a 
consistent standard and rounded to an amount between two and four decimal places.  The 
easiest way for the remittance transfer providers to meet  this requirement of  the 
regulation is to  apply the foreign exchange upfront and make the payment in the other 
currency.  While this is fairly straightforward for the providers to comply with,  this may 
result in a limit of consumer choice.  Institutions may limit the consumer’s ability to send 
USD to an account known to be denominated in a foreign currency because of the 
difficulty in disclosing  the exchange rate as required by law.  There may be additional 
costs to the consumer because the rate of exchange used  by the consumer’s remittance 
transfer provider may be less favorable than  the rate applied when the funds are being 
credited at the beneficiary institution.  Overall, the requirement of disclosing the 
exchange rate to the sender should not have a negative impact on consumer utility. 
Actually, it will produce some positive benefits to the remittance transfer providers by 
shifting the revenue that stems from the foreign exchange conversion from the foreign 
institutions upstream to the remittance transfer providers. 
Now let’s move to the disclosure of foreign taxes collected by the recipient 
institution, the “Other Taxes” element of the disclosure.  This disclosure of tax 
requirement is isolated to taxes that are required to be collected as a direct result of 
servicing a wire transfer.  The regulation originally required that all taxes  imposed by 
parties other than the remittance transfer provider  must be disclosed, including non-
national taxes such as provincial or regional.  This would be very challenging for the 
remittance transfer providers to comply with because of the sheer number of possibilities. 
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There are roughly 200 countries in the world and  if required to capture each of the 
possible local and regional taxes,  the number of data points required  increases 
exponentially.  Also, after research among the industry relating to collecting tax 
information at just the national level, the data  shows that taxes are not regularly imposed 
on servicing of a wire transfer.   Furthermore, the amount of the tax being collected is 
typically much smaller in magnitude compared to the fees imposed.  Essentially the cost 
burden required to collect the information at the level of detail needed didn’t yield the 
incremental benefit of disclosing these sub-national taxes to the consumer.  On December  
20, 2012, the CFPB provided a reprieve from this sub-national tax requirement by  
issuing a revised proposal of this  provision of the final regulation,  along with a few 
other provisions. The revised proposal gives the  remittance transfer providers the ability 
to disclose only national level taxes, provided they inform the consumer that this amount 
of “Other Taxes” is an estimate and  sub-national taxes may be imposed.lix   Also, the 
revised proposal provides  flexibility in that if a particular recipient institution imposes 
the tax in a manner differently than described by the letter of the law.  In addition it also 
allows the remittance transfer provider to assume the worst possible tax bracket of the 
recipient, if that variable affects the tax collected and the sender does not know the 
specific variables that will affect the tax rate.  While the proposed rule  allows for the 
disclosure of taxes imposed only at the national level  has not been finalized, it is widely 
expected to be adopted without significant change.  The excessive cost burden required to 
collect and maintain sub-national taxes placed on the transfer providers did not yield 
enough of a benefit to the consumer.  Furthermore, it is likely that this requirement would  
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have driven providers out of the market as well as resulting in a portion of the cost 
burden being passed onto the consumers.  The biggest challenge with this requirement is 
the on-going maintenance of the information.  Collecting the information will be 
strenuous, but keeping the information current and fresh on a real-time basis will be a 
much bigger hurdle for remittance transfer providers to comply with.  Since this element 
of the regulation is independent from a consumer’s  choice of remittance transfer 
provider,  this is one area where collaboration is possible without giving away any 
competitive advantage as well as possibly  helping to ease the total cost burden across the 
market participants. 
The aspect of the transparency requirements that is causing the most headaches 
among the market participants is the display of third-party fees; “Other Fees” on the 
disclosure documents.  As previously discussed, it is very common during a cross-border 
payment transaction for there to be multiple stops in the payment flow.  As a result of 
servicing the transfer along the way, many institutions charge a fee for this service.  
There are many ways for payment providers to apply these fees. One way would be to 
bill the institution that sent the payment to them. For example, bank A (US bank) sends 
bank B (foreign bank with account at bank A) one thousand wire transfers per month and 
at the end of the month bank A sends bank B a bill for the cost of crediting those one 
thousand transfers to bank B’s account.  Over the years a practice has developed among 
institutions to shift some of the cost burden off to others.  Instead of being charged 
separately, institutions would strike agreements to take the fee off the principal of the 
cross-border payment.  The beneficiary of the payment now bears the cost burden 
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because  the beneficiary receives a lesser amount due to a portion of the payment being 
lifted off of it as a service fee by market participants.  The specifics aspects of this fee are 
typically unknown to both the sender and the beneficiary.   Also, depending on the type 
of relationship the beneficiary has with  the beneficiary’s institution, a charge may be 
applied to credit the funds to their account.   
The challenge facing the remittance transfer providers is how  to disclose to a 
customer the total amount of fees that will be applied as a result of the payment.   First, 
let’s examine the lifting fees that institutions take off the principal of the payment. One 
option institutions have is to use an approach where they instruct the other institutions  
not to take any fees off the payment and for not taking a fee off the payment they can 
claim a charge back to the sending institution. We will call this the “charges OUR 
method.”  This approach of guaranteeing that the principal of the payment is not touched 
is executed in practice by placing a code word in field 71 of the SWIFT message.  
However,  it is not common practice today for institutions to provide this service on all 
cross-border payments.  Moving to a “charges OUR method” will result in additional 
costs to remittance transfer providers through increased claim backs for charges and  it  
would not be surprising if a portion of these incremental costs are passed off  to the 
customer.  However, this still does not solve the remittance transfer provider’s 
requirement to disclose the fees the recipient institution charges the beneficiary, which 
we analyze shortly.   Another option that remittance transfer providers can undertake is to 
keep the payment practice as is and just disclose the fees taken.  Dodd-Frank 1073 does 
not prevent institutions from taking fees off consumer cross-border payments, but just 
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requires that if there are fees  then  they  must be disclosed.  While there needs to be 
significant work done to make this a reality, is it possible for a remittance transfer 
provider to be able to disclose these fees every time?  In some cases a provider could 
disclose these fees because the beneficiary institution holds an account with the 
remittance transfer provider.  Since the transfer happens all within the provider’s books, 
it would be possible for the provider  to know what amount, if any, is deducted from the 
principal of the payment.  In other cases though, the payment must be sent to a 
correspondent of the beneficiary bank because the beneficiary bank does not hold an 
account with the remittance transfer provider.  It would be very difficult to know the 
exact arrangement the beneficiary institution has with  its correspondent.  Remittance 
transfer providers do have the  authority  to estimate this fee, but that authority expires in 
July of 2015, roughly two years after the regulation is expected to take effect. 
The December  revised proposal provides further  authority to estimate when it 
comes to the fee the recipient institution charges the beneficiary to credit the funds to  the 
beneficiary’s account.  Prior to the  revised proposal, the  authority to estimate this fee 
was also set to expire in July 2015.  This would have been very challenging for 
remittance transfer providers.  A particular institution may have endless arrangements 
depending on the status of the beneficiary.  It would require remittance transfer providers 
to know the exact status of the beneficiary with the recipient institution.  The  revised 
proposal allows  institutions to rely  on  publish fee schedules, as well as fee schedules of 
similar institutions in the event that the recipient institution does not have a published fee 
schedule. Substantial effort is still required to collect this information, even with the 
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further relaxations from the December  revised proposal, but it is possible for an 
institution to accomplish if given the proper resource devotion.  Essentially,  the revised 
proposal allows a remittance transfer provider to assume the beneficiary is  a typical 
average customer of the recipient institution who would not have any special 
arrangement.  An element that is not part of the pre-payment disclosure, but provided on 
the receipt after the payment is authorized is the date the funds will be available to the 
recipient.  The revised rule allows for banks to  estimate a date and note that funds may 
be available sooner.  This, coupled with the elements of the pre-payment disclosure, 
provides the end-to-end transparency  for the sender of the payment.  The sender now has 
the ability to know how much the recipient will receive net of all charges and when they 
will receive it.   
Are Consumers Better Off? 
 While there are significant challenges to the sender  in collecting and maintaining 
all the information required to be disclosed upfront,  it is possible for the sender to meet 
the requirements of the regulation.  Since it is possible to  meet the requirements, will the 
consumer experience the utility boost provided by transparency?  According to a survey 
conducted by the technology firm Fundtech, most financial institutions believe, with a 
resounding consistency, that the overall impact of this regulation will be negative.  
Consumers will see little, if any, gains and there will be significant negative impact to 
small firms in the payments business.lx   
So the question  is, will the regulation have the intended impact or will there be 
the consistent theme of negative unintended consequences due to a poorly implemented 
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regulation?  Well, it is likely that the significant increased costs incurred by remittance 
transfer providers will be passed off in some form to the consumer.  The question then 
becomes, does the benefit of transparency outweigh the incremental cost the consumer 
bears?  One case can be made that transparency of prices will result in price competition 
among producers and thus the consumer will be better off.  While that theory holds true, 
it also hinges on the number of producers in the market remaining fixed.  The significant 
cost required for compliance as a remittance transfer provider is likely to push some of 
those market participants who are on the margin out of the business.   
One variable affecting the compliance cost is the size of the remittance transfer 
provider.  Small providers may benefit from less complexity compared to their larger 
counterparts but they are also harmed by their size.  The financial supermarkets of the 
largest banks realize gains from economies of scale.  They have a global presence and 
deep correspondent networks that are lacking in the small regional banks.  The 
multinational component of the largest remittance transfer providers presents them with a 
competitive advantage in the opportunity cost required to collect the information needed 
for the disclosure elements of the regulation.  Their size benefits them in other aspects as 
well. Such as, dedicating sufficient resources to the efforts needed to transform their 
payment platforms into becoming compliant  with the regulation.  Keeping in line with 
the classification of banks in  relation to the Derivatives section of this paper, Mid-Size 
regional banks are defined as those institutions with $10-50 billion in assets.  Meanwhile, 
according to Federal Reserve data collected in September 2012, the four largest financial 
institutions in the US each have over $1.3 trillion in assets; institutions 11-15 have a 
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combined asset value of $1.2 trillion.lxi  In other words, merging these institutions would 
only create the 5th largest bank in the US.  One can argue that this is the evidence of “Too 
Big to Fail” and while that topic is not the theme of this chapter, Skeel points out that the 
Dodd-Frank Act does not address the  “Too Big to Fail” size of the banks at the top and 
may further enhance their systemic importance as the entrants to the market are turned off 
by the costs of regulation, a view shared by Jamie Dimon of JP Morgan Chase.lxii  The 
“big four” institutionslxiii  are all significant participants in the retail banking market in 
which the clientele that falls under the scope of Dodd-Frank 1073 reside.  Even if the cost 
for compliance was double for the big banks compared to the mid-size regionals, their 
sheer size makes it easier to allocate the resources needed for compliance.  For many of 
these smaller providers who provide cross-border payment services as an ancillary 
benefit to their clients, they will have to examine and make a determination whether to 
continue to provide these services when compliance with the Dodd-Frank 1073 
requirements is in effect.  One institution has already decided that it will no longer offer 
cross-border wire transfers due to the requirements of Dodd-Frank 1073.  On November 
20, 2012, the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York announced that it was exiting the 
international wire business at the end of the year as a result Dodd-Frank 1073.lxiv  
Another option would be for these mid-size regional banks to leverage the larger banks 
payment systems to process their Dodd-Frank payments.  These largest financial 
institutions, which have extensive retail banking divisions, also have wholesale banking 
units.  As certain mid-size regional banks can no longer  afford to be a direct participant 
in the cross-border payment market, there is an incentive for the bigger banks to develop 
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solutions that they can sell to other banks in addition to their own retail solution.  Again 
the economy of scale advantage favors the big banks and here the question becomes what 
is the net effect to the consumer?  As discussed in the description of cross-border 
payments, adding intermediaries to the payment chain  correlates directly to an increased 
cost of the transaction.  The mid-size regional bank will face increase cost  since they will 
have to go through a US intermediary instead of being a direct participant in the cross-
border payment market.  It does not take much imagination to envision that at least  a 
portion of this incremental cost will be passed off to the sender.  This reduction in the 
supply of remittance transfer providers will temper the effect on prices of providing 
transparency.  Furthermore, the consumers whose institutions no longer offer cross-
border payment services will have to find a new provider for their cross-border payment 
services.   
Another likely outcome of this regulation is a reduction in the supply of 
destinations  where a cross-border payment can be sent.  Even the largest institutions, 
whose scale yields them a competitive advantage to collect information, will face 
struggles getting the necessary information needed to deliver payments to the same set of 
markets that they do today.  The December proposal eased some of the burden, but did 
not completely lift it.  From a risk management perspective it would not be surprising to 
see institutions begin to limit Dodd-Frank 1073 payments to markets where they have 
sufficient information to reasonably disclose the charges to the customer.  As mentioned 
earlier, there is likely to be limits in the currencies available for delivery because if a 
foreign exchange is to occur, the rate used to convert the funds must be disclosed.  
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Expanding on that, it would not be surprising if entire markets, regions, and institutions 
are no longer available to receive a Dodd-Frank 1073 payment because the remittance 
transfer provider lacks sufficient information to meet the requirements of the regulation 
for that particular payment.  This clearly has negative implications on the consumer who  
must now  find another method to deliver the payment to  the consumer’s desired 
location.  The opportunity costs tied to finding another method to execute the payment 
have a negative impact on the consumer’s utility, the exact opposite intention of the 
Dodd-Frank 1073 regulation. 
Yes, some consumers will experience an increase in utility from this transparency, 
but for many the cost that is imposed on them because of this transparency may  exceed 
the benefit.  It is unlikely that Dodd-Frank 1073 will result in a reduction of prices borne 
by the sender of the transaction.  Some portion of the cost for compliance is likely to be 
passed off to the consumer. Also, the number of market participants is likely  to decrease 
as those near the margin exit the business in the face of the new costs.  This reduction in 
the number of remittance transfer providers means it is less likely  we will see prices 
driven down as a result of transparency.  We may see institutions strike bilateral 
agreements with foreign banks for special processing of Dodd-Frank 1073 payments.  
That may make the costs associated with a cross-border payment more consistent across 
the various countries of the world, but it is unlikely to bring prices down on a global 
scale.  In the end, the Dodd-Frank 1073 regulation has good intentions, but in practice 
will unlikely have as much of  a positive impact as regulators envision.  Consumers will 
likely have less choice of remittance transfer providers and increased costs, which 
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counteracts any utility benefit gained by transparency and additional protections of Dodd-
Frank 1073.  The only one who truly benefits  from Dodd-Frank 1073 is the beneficiary 
of the payment.  The sender will now be able to tell  the beneficiary the amount of funds 
the beneficiary will receive and that  they will be available by a particular date.  Also, if a 
majority of the industry moves to a “charges OUR method,” the beneficiary will receive 
added benefits because they no longer bear the cost of having a fee deducted from the 
principal of the payment.  It shall be very interesting to see how this develops once in 
practice.  If there is a successful implementation of the rule,  it would not be surprising to 
see similar regulations  established in other countries.   
 US consumers whose utility should experience an increase from transparency are 
likely to experience the opposite effect driven by a combination of higher prices, more 
restrictive options, and potentially  the need to find a new medium to execute the cross-
border payment if their traditional providers decide to exit the market.  Remittance 
transfer providers are also likely to experience negative effects driven from the high cost 
of compliance and the ability for some people to game the system, although the recent 
proposal in December helped eased this concern  by shifting some of that risk from the 
provider to the sender.  International banking practice is to rely on the account number 
when crediting the funds, but the original rule  required that if the  recipient named did 
not receive funds because the account number  was wrong on the transaction,  then the 
provider was on the hook for the full amount of the payment.  Once  a payment is sent 
there is no legal obligation to return the funds.  This provides a ripe opportunity for 
fraudulent schemes.  However, the revised proposed rule  relieves the remittance transfer 
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providers of this burden and puts the onus on the sender.lxv  Some of the larger remittance 
transfer providers will see some offsetting benefits  because of increased market share as 
the smaller providers on the margin exit the business.  Overall, there will be fewer market 
participants for the consumer to price shop the transaction as the regulation intended.  
The only group that will likely benefit, although the magnitude of the benefit is uncertain, 
are the recipients of the transactions.  Indirectly they will receive the benefits of the 
regulation, certainty on the amount received and when the funds will be available.  
Naturally, they will need to be informed of this by the sender, but, nonetheless, they will 
see the benefits of the regulation with little to no incremental costs borne by them.  It is 
unlikely that foreign financial institutions will raise their prices for crediting incoming 
wire transfers due to a U.S. regulation that has little impact  on them.  While this rule is a 
true game changer in the payments business, it is unlikely that the outcome to the various 
market participants will yield the intended consequences the CFPB and Congress 
envisioned. That is, enhancing consumer utility in the US through transparency and 
greater protections around cross-border payments.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Although we have only examined two aspects of the broader Act, it does allow for 
some conclusions to be drawn related to the overall effectiveness of Dodd-Frank.  While 
there are many good things that will be accomplished as a result of Dodd-Frank it is hard 
to envision that the intended consequences will come to their full effectiveness.  For one 
Dodd-Frank does not end “Too Big to Fail”.  In fact, it likely increases the importance of 
the largest financial institutions.  The increased cost to become compliant with the 
various rules of the Act will be a deterrent to new firms entering into the industry.  
Furthermore, many of the smaller firms whose pool of resources is no where near the size 
of the biggest banks will struggle to meet the costs of compliance, which could lead to 
further consolidation.   
The overhaul of the OTC derivatives market, while designed with good 
intentions, may actually have the opposite effect  on limiting the systemic risk those 
financial instruments pose to the safety of the  overall financial system.  The cost of 
compliance will prevent new firms from becoming swap dealers, the concentration of 
exposure at the CCPs could be catastrophic if one were to fail, and the increased cost 
borne by end-users who use swaps to mitigate risk, all counteract the good intentions of 
bringing transparency to the OTC derivatives market and the benefits to go along with 
that transparency.  Consumers will likely be worse off as a result of the CFPB’s 
Remittance Transfer rule through either increased costs to transact, limited choice in their 
ability to make a payment to their intended recipient, or a combination of the two. 
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Overall, Dodd-Frank does some good things and takes needed steps towards a 
safer financial system.  However, there are many missteps on the way that will limit the 
overall effectiveness of the Act and its goal of preventing another financial crisis like the 
2008-2009 one that brought the financial system and the global economy to the brink.  
The financial system of the 21st century is a global one and, as such, meaningful reform 
will require coordination at the global level. 
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Figure 1- The Web of Financial Regulators 
 
 
Retrieved from: http://blogs.hbr.org/ashkenas/2012/03/is-dodd-frank-too-complex-to-
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